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INTRODUCTION
The Vietnam conflict was a part of American life for 
many years, from the first Military Advisory Command for 
Vietnam set up by President Kennedy in February, 1962 to the 
final withdrawal by President Nixon in 1973. Its images 
flickered across the television screens and flashed in 
newspapers so that images of the conflict were indelibly 
stamped in the memories of millions of Americans, and 
millions more beyond our shores. As Lyndon Johnson put it, 
all the horrors of war were brought into the living rooms of 
America. (Johnson, p.241) No military conflict in American 
history had seen American troops fighting in one country for 
so long. Many Americans wanted a simple answer to a difficult 
question: Why? Why, after so long, had we not won? Why
after so many tons of bombs dropped, had the North st^l not 
folded? Why had no one in government seen the futility of 
the effort and put an end to American involvement? George 
Ball, who served in the State Department during both the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations did see the futility of 
America's commitment. George Ball's prognostications 
regarding the Vietnam conflict were not acted upon by Lyndon 
Johnson because of a commitment to goals based on faulty 
assumptions.
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This work shows that at three critical junctures in the 
history of American involvement in Vietnam, George Ball had 
grave doubts about the course of American policy. When the 
Southeast Asia Resolution, often erroneously called the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution, was passed by Congress, Ball saw it 
for the broad grant of presidential power that it was. In a 
memo prepared in the fall of 1964, Ball cautioned against 
massive bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of 
ground troops. As history shows, his words were not heeded.
The work presents an account of these three incidents, 
as reported by the American media and as recalled by those in 
the Johnson administration. Where relevant, significant 
differences in the recollections of these events among 
government officials are noted. Following that, an analysis 
of Lyndon Johnson's assumptions which trapped America in 
Vietnam for so long is offered. Lastly, an analysis of George 
Ball's reservations and prognostications on the conflict is 
presented. It is obvious that the drive of Johnson 
overshadowed the logic and empiricism of Ball's advice. The 
work, of necessity, draws heavily on the memoirs of both
Johnson and Ball.
PART I
In August, 1964, there were patrols by American 
destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, located between North 
Vietnam and mainland China. Called DeSoto patrols, their 
stated purpose was electronic eavesdropping on the 
infiltration of Vietcong units into South Vietnam. On August 
3, 1964 the New York Times ran the headline MRed PT Boats
Fire on U.S. Destroyer".(New York Times. August 3, 1964, p.l)
At that time, government officials quoted in the Times said 
that this was "not a major crisis".(NYT. August 3, 1964, p.l) 
A similar attitude was put forth by an official at the 
Department of Defense. Quoted in the Times, he commented 
that this incident was "unwelcome, but not serious".(NYT. 
August 3, 1964, p.l) Lyndon Johnson's response was not 
particularly antagonistic. Rather than order any type of 
retaliatory actions, he asserted the right of these ships to 
continue to operate in international waters. However,
Johnson issued orders that if these ships were attacked in 
the future in the Gulf of Tonkin, they were to shoot to 
destroy the attackers. It was also revealed by the government 
at that time that such patrols had been taking place in the 
Gulf of Tonkin for two years.(NYT. August 4, 1964, p.l)
The attitude of the Johnson administration changed
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substantially and rapidly after reports of a second attack In 
the Gulf on Tonkin. It was reported in the Times of August 
5, 1964 that there had been a second attack. This second
attack was reported to have taken place at night and in bad 
weather. Where the first attack had not been a serious 
situation to any quoted government official, this second 
attack was looked at a bit differently. Rather, a government 
official was quoted as saying that "We are in a very serious 
situation."(UiX» August 5, 1964, p.l) The Times reported at
the time that the Chinese were believed to be the instigators 
of the attacks by the North Vie tname se. (NYT. August 5, 1964,
p.2) Lyndon Johnson approved an air strike against four 
patrol boat bases and an oil storage facility. These strikes, 
targeted with the help of Robert McNamara, Secretary of 
Defense, were reported to the American people on television 
by Johnson after the planes had done their damage. After the 
first attack, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, stated that "The 
other side got a sting out of this. If they do it again, 
they'll get another sting."(OX. August 3, 1964, p.l)
These incidents proved to be the impetus for Lyndon 
Johnson to ask Congress for the authority to issue military 
commands without Congressional approval or oversight. After 
the report of the second attack and the retaliatory air 
strike, Johnson asked Congress for approval of the Southeast 
Asia Resolution, also called the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. The 
measure allowed, in part, for Johnson to "take all necessary
measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the 
United States and to prevent further aggression. 1 (NYT. August 
6, 1964, p.l) Although the measure was adopted almost 
unanimously in both houses of Congress (416-0 in the House, 
88-2 in the Senate), it was not without controversy at the 
time. There was concern among some members of Congress that 
the language was "unnecessarily broad". Further, many in 
Congress saw the possibility that the measure would be used 
later to justify Johnson sending United States troops to 
South Vietnam with implicit Congressional support. Yet, the 
urgency of the moment, as portrayed by the administration, 
left little time for debate on the measure.(NYT, August 6, 
1964, p.l)
The facts surrounding the August incidents in the Gulf 
of Tonkin are the subject of dispute among those who were in 
government at the time. The most disputed matter is whether 
or not there really was a second attack against the U.S. 
destroyers on patrol at the time, Lyndon Johnson asserts 
that Robert McNamara and his associates had no doubt that a 
second attack had taken place.(Johnson, p.115) Chester 
Cooper, however, recalls that it was only after Admiral 
Sharp, the commander of the task force on patrol at the time, 
talked to McNamara were his (McNamara's) doubts removed. 
(Cooper, p.240) Testifying in 1968 before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, McNamara said that his doubts regarding 
the attacks had been removed by intelligence sources of a
"highly classified and unimpeachable nature". These sources 
established that attacks had taken place on August 2nd and 
4th "without question".(McNamara, p.9) Walt Rostov, then 
head of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department, 
claims in his book that there had been no second attack at 
all. The conclusion he reaches from this assertion is that 
the U.S. policy in getting into the Vietnam conflict is 
"morally groundless".(Rostow, p.487)
Two writers on the Vietnam conflict who were not in 
government are David Halberstam and Stanley Karnow. Their 
accounts of the incidents are not "first: hand" but gathered 
from those in government who did have knowledge of this sort.
In these writers' accounts of the incidents, a greater 
sense of doubt is seen among the government officials.
Halberstam quotes Johnson as saying of the attack, eight 
months after the fact:, that "For all I know, our navy was 
shooting at whales out there(Halberstam, p.504) Karnow 
calls the incident "curious", but goes no further than that 
towards an indictment of the account of the incident. He 
reports that Rostow had conceived of a plan in February, 19^4 
for Johnson to widen the conflict in Vietnam by obtaining a 
"blank check" from Congress.(Karnow, p.357) Further, he 
reports that on March 1, 1964, William Bundy, then the
assistant secretary of defense, told Johnson that he 
(Johnson) would need a congressional resolution in order to 
conduct military operations of any substance in Viet
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nam.(Karnow, p.344) Bundy's recommendation to Johnson was to 
get a resolution passed in Congress which would allow Johnson 
to deploy forces in Vietnam as "he deemed necessary". Bundy 
finished the rough draft of this resolution in May,
1964.(Karnow, p.361) Karnow continues on, asserting that
Johnson and those on his staff used an incident which may or 
may not have occurred as it had been reported in order to get 
apparently quite pleased with the resolution as it stood when 
it left Congress. He is quoted as saying that the resolution 
was "like Grandma's nightshirt-it covered every thing.H(Karnow, 
p . 3 7 3 -4)
The beginning of sustained aerial attacks on North 
Vietnam began in February, 1965. On February 6, 1965, United
States planes bombed a barracks in North Vietnam suspected of 
being used by the Vietcong in retaliation for an attack on 
the Pleiku barracks by the Vietcong. The response, called 
Flaming Dart, started within hours of Johnson's being 
notified of the attack on Pleiku. At this time, there seemed 
to be near unanimity among Johnson's advisors that this 
attack was needed. Johnson recalled that even George Ball 
was in support of the raid (Johnson, p.124), but Ball stated 
in his memoirs that he supported the decision to retaliate 
only because he saw that opposition to the measure was 
futile, given the overwhelming support for the measure among 
his colleagues.(Ball, p.390) Throughout February, Johnson 
stepped up the bombing of targets in North Vietnam. During
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that month, a change emerged in Johnson's aerial strategy.
The early air attacks had been retaliatory in nature.
However, the pattern emerged by the end of February chat 
these latest attacks were part of an air offensive against 
the North Vietnamese.(Karnow, p.414-5)
The program of sustained air attacks against targets in 
North Vietnam began on March 3, 1965. The initial attack of
this program was an ammunition dump. Following the Initial 
attack, there was an eleven day pause in the bombing, after 
which the attacks became much more frequent.(Johnson, p.130)
This program was called Rollii.g Thunder, Although the 
program was scheduled to last only eight weeks, it was the 
beginning of a systematic aerial bombing of North Vietnam 
which was to last until the cease-fire agreement was signed 
in January, 1973.(Karnow, p.415) This pause in the bombing 
was the first of eight during the Johnson administration.
Many of the pauses were over the holiday period of late 
December to early January. The complete bombing pauses had a 
duration of anywhere from twenty-four hours to thirty six 
days. There were also bombing pauses which were not 
comprehensive. Rather, this type of bombing pause was 
limited to a certain area. Usually, these pauses would 
suspend bombing within ten nautical miles of the center of 
Hano i .
These pauses were originally intended to be a gesture of 
goodwill to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong in order to
8
bring them to the negotiating table. In his memoirs, Lyndon 
Johnson recalled the pauses as being worthless. Not only did 
the pauses not have the effect of inducing peace negotia 
tions, they also allowed the North Vietnamese and the 
Vietcong to continue to infiltrate South Vietnam with troops 
and supp1ies.(Johnson, p.241) Whatever the effect of the 
bombing was on this infiltration, it was non-existent during 
the pauses. A more complete analysis of the bombing pauses 
is presented in Chapter II.
The bombing of North Vietnam was not like the bombing of 
Germany and Japan during World War II. Hanoi was never 
subjected to fireborabings in the way that Dresden and Tokyo 
had. The selection of targets was carefully controlled by 
Lyndon Johnson himself. He is quoted as saying that ’They 
can't even bomb an outhouse without my permission.” As 
previously mentioned, there were many times during the 
hostilities when Hanoi and Haiphong were not targeted for 
bombings. Further, the extensive dike system along the Red 
River was never attacked. If this had been done, the 
resulting flooding would have, in all likelihood, killed 
hundreds of thousands of civilians. The reasons that this 
careful overview of targeting took place was the fear that 
the Communist Chinese would intervene in North Viet 
nam.(Karnow, p.415)
The use of ground troops was another dimension of the 
conflict in Vietnam which was characterized by slow
Introduction and more rapid escalation as their effectiveness 
diminished. When Lyndon Johnson assumed office after the 
assassination of President Kennedy, there were 16,000 
American military personnel in Vietnam. These were not 
combat troops, rather, they constituted a military advisory 
force. By the end of 1964, there were an additional 7,000 
advisors in the country. On February 22, 1965, only two 
weeks after the attack on the barracks at Pleiku, a request 
for two battalions of Marines was made by General William 
Westmoreland. The justification for this request of combat 
troops was the need to defend the United States airfield at 
Danang. It was at this base that planes too large to operate 
from aircraft carriers were stationed.(Karnow, p.415) The 
planes based at Danang were the le rge bombers used in the 
Rolling Thunder operation. The New York Times made only a 
small note of the Marines' arrival at Danang. ’United States 
Marines began landing this morning at the bay north of Danang 
to take: up security duties around the large United States Jet 
airfield there . " (HU, March, 8, 1965, p.l)
On April 1, 1965 General Westmoreland asked for two 
things from Lyndon Johnson. Jne was more troops. He asked 
for two additional battalions for the defense of United 
States' installations near Hue. He also asked for an 
additional 18,000 support personnel to be sent to Vietnam.
The second thing which Westmoreland asked for was a change in 
the "mission** of combat troops in Vietnam. Previously, the
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troops had a purely defensive mission. They were there to 
protect U.S. bases. The change which Westmoreland asked for 
was to allow these troops to patrol the countryside around 
these bases. He felt that the “best defense is a strong 
offense".(Karnow, p.415) Johnson granted both of these 
requests. By the middle of April, 1965, the presence of over 
40,000 Americans in Vietnam was approved. Thirty-three 
thousand five hundred of those were in the country. During 
the rest of 1965 troop levels advanced rapidly. By the end 
of April, over 50,000 troops were in Vietnam. That number 
climbed above 75,000 by the end of July. By the end of 1965, 
there were over 184,000 Americans in Vietnam.(Johnson, p.140, 
147, 233)
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PART II
As soon as Lyndon Johnson assumed the Presidency after 
the assassination of John Kennedy in November, 1963, he began 
conducting United States policy in Vietnam using some very 
basic principles, He would not change these principles for 
the majority of his time in office. Only after the Vietcong 
show of force during the Tet offensive of 1968 did Johnson 
become convinced that United States policy in Vietnam needed 
to be altered substantially. These principles, and the way 
in which they influenced Johnson's decision to involve 
American forces more deeply in the conflict, as well as how 
they influenced his decision to remain in the quagmire for so 
long, will be examined in this section of the work. Lyndon 
Johnson remained firmly committed to the principle that the 
United States must not allow South Vietnam to fall victim to 
the Communist insurgency from the North. During the course 
of United States involvement in Vietnam, this principle 
manifested itself in several ways. One of these was the 
espousal of the domino theory, as it was applied to Southeast 
Asia. Johnson recalled the domino theory was part of the 
rationale for policy making in the region. Charles de Gaulle 
had suggested in August, 1963 that the North and South 
Vietnam be unified, and tho region neutralized. Johnson,
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however asserted that "most thinking people" would realize 
that this plan would lead to the communization of Vietnam, 
Laos and Cambodia.(Johnson, p.63) Johnson was also resolved
to maintain the commitments of John Kennedy to the security 
of the region. Kennedy had believed in the U.S. commitment 
to the security of Southeast Asia. Upon taking over the 
reins of government in November, 1963, Johnson asserted that 
the United States must "see things through" in Vietnam. 
Despite the tragedy of Kennedy's death, Johnson was 
determined to focus on the goals of government.(Johnson, 
p.153) Certainly, one of these goals was the resolution of 
Vietnamese situation
Johnson's thoughts on the domino theory were still in 
evidence in 1965 when he listed options available to the 
United States in Vietnam. If the United States were to 
withdraw from Vietnam, Johnson was convinced that Asia, as 
far as Singapore, would soon fall to the Communists. At  his 
time, he extended his thoughts on the consequences of 
American withdrawal to Europe, Asia, and the Midd * East. He 
feared that the signs of weakness exhibited by > « s a 
withdrawal would force the United States i n t o  a i o l  as the 
defender of all of these regions from f o r c e  t a k i n g  o r d e r s  
from Moscow, Peking, or both. Johnson t e a r  d h a t  h i s  role 
would be assumed by the United States a f t e r  th se enemy 
forces had committed themselves to thi adv nt. u ism. (Johnson, 
p . 152) In July, 1965, he no c that was co icerned that if
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the United States were to leave Southeast Asia, that the 
resulting trouble would not be limited to that region alone. 
Rather, he foresaw trouble on a worldwide scale. The Middle 
East, Europe, Latin America, and Africa were all potential 
trouble spots if the United States had made the move which 
would have felled the first domino. The United States, 
Johnson said, would not Just walk away from South Vietnam. 
Johnson went so far as to say that this potential retreat 
from a challenge would ’open the path to World War 
III."(Johnson, p.148)
The fear of the consequences of the domino theory were 
not the only reasons that influenced Johnson in his decision 
to keep American forces committed to the Vietnam conflict. 
Another of the reasons he felt that the United States must 
remain in Vietnam was that withdrawal would result in a loss 
of confidence in the U.S. from our allies. If it appeared 
that the United States were abandoning its promise to protect 
the security of Southeast Asia, our allies would operate from 
the new premise that the word of the United States was 
worthless. The trust which had been built with our allies 
would be deeply shaken by a United States lack of resolve in 
the region. He remained steadfast in his commitment that the 
United States would, at all times, defend our friends.
Johnson was also concerned that there had been three 
Presidents who had been committed to not allowing aggression 
to un e the region and to the defense and security of
Vietnam. Johnson was afraid of a domestic uproar if Vietnam 
were "lost”, just as there had been when China was "lost" in 
the 1940's. Johnson pictured this "divisive debate" as being 
more destructive to the "national life" than the debate after 
the fall of China had been. Johnson also expressed a fear at 
being remembered as the "President who lost Vietnam".
(Johnson, p.152)
Johnson stated in his memoirs that of all the decisions 
he made during the Vietnam conflict, the decision to send 
American combat troops to Vietnam was "by far the 
hardest"(Johnson, p . 1 3 7 ) In 1963, he had been told by Dean 
Rusk and McNamara that the troops which were there at the 
time, constituting the advisory force, would be home by the 
end of 1965. Obviously, in the spring of 1965, a different 
outlook was pervasive than in 1963. He justified the decision 
to grant Westmoreland's request for combat troops partially 
on the grounds that the soldiers wh> were already there 
deserved all the support that the United States could 
provide. This was in response to the attacks against 
American barracks and airfieIds.(Johnson, p.132)
By the end of July, 1965, when there were 75,000 
American soldiers in Vietnam, Johnson had listed what he 
considered to be several options for American policy in the 
area. One of these options was to simply withdraw. This 
option was quickly rejected. Johnson's reasons for 
dismissing this option can be plainly seen in the information
presented earlier. Quite simply, Johnson was not going to be 
remembered as the leader who lost Vietnam to the communists. 
Another option was to keep troop levels and the overall level 
of commitment to the region exactly as it was at the time.
This was rejected on the grounds that the American forces 
which were in Vietnam were having a difficult time holding 
territory and keeping losses to a minimum. A third option 
was to go back to the Congress and ask that the United States 
be placed on a war footing and call up the military reserves. 
This option was rejected as being too provocative to the 
Soviet Union and China. Johnson feared that they might begin 
aiding the North Vietnamese with more than just material: he
feared that their troops might intervene in the conflict. The 
fourth option was to use the Strategic Air Command to "bring 
the enemy to his knees." The option which was finally 
suggested was that Johnson, using the power granted to him in 
the Southeast Asia Resolution, could give the commanders in 
Vietnam the men and supplies that they felt they needed to 
complete the mission there. Specifically, this meant doubling 
the number of combat troops in Vietnam within five months.
(J ohnson, p .149)
This last option was correct, he reasoned, based on the 
United States' commitment to Vietnam. Aggression must be 
resisted. To that end, Johnson authorized a doubling of the 
troop level by the end of 1965. Early in 1967, Johnson was 
confident that things were beginning to look brighter for the
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South. He was pleased that the "tide of the war" was 
beginning to favor the South Vietnamese. This was in spite 
of reports from General Westmoreland that the overall level 
of enemy forces had not declined. That is, all the enemy 
soldiers who were being killed were being replaced with North 
Vietnamese regulars and recruits from South Vietnam. This 
optimism was also in spite of the fact that the combined 
force levels of the South Vietnamese combat brigades and the 
American troops were not sufficient to defend against 
guerrilla attacks. It was a well accepted rule of thumb 
that, in a guerilla warfare situation such as was found in 
Vietnam, that the defender requires a ten-to-one numerical 
advantage to secure victory. Johnson was well aware of this 
rule. (Johnson, p.245) Based on the reported strength of the 
enemy, the combined force totals needed by the South 
Vietnamese and the Americans for victory was two million.
Yet, ne dismissed these calculations, reasoning that superior 
mobility and firepower would compensate for the numerical 
shortfalls.
All of this is not to suggest that Johnson did not seek 
a negotiated solution to the conflict during this time. In 
his memoirs, he asserts that throughout his presidency, a 
peaceful solution was the goal of the United States.(Johnson, 
p.249) The means to obtain the end of peace during the 
Johnson years were usually of one of two types. The first of 
these was a symbolic gesture to the North Vietnamese in the
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form of a bombing pause. The second was direct and indirect 
contacts with Hanoi in an effort to negotiate an end to the 
hostilities .
The first bombing pause came on May 10, 1965. In an
accompanying statement, Johnson indicated that the United 
States would be watching for a reduction in armed actions by 
the enemy during this pause. The desire to use a bombing 
pause in order to show good intentions to the North 
Vietnamese was a recurring theme throughout the bombing 
campaign. The second pause, on Christmas Eve, 1965, was 
ordered by Johnson after lengthy deliberation. Recalling 
that the first pause had failed in its goal, he ordered the 
second one with the realization that it was a risk.(Johnson, 
p.238) The risk was that the North Vietnamese would continue 
to infiltrate the South with supplies during the cessation.
The fact that there were no pauses ordered during 1966 until 
late December is a commentary on the success of the second 
pause. It was, as were all the other pauses, a failure.
As early at the beginning of 1967, Johnson realized that 
the use oi bombing pauses as an inducement to the North 
Vietnamese to come to the bargaining table was failing.
Johnson felt that any problems between nations could be 
solved if the parties involved would only talk it out. At 
the beginning of 1967, Johnson decided to attempt to gain 
peace through direct contacts with Ho Chi Minh. (Johrison, 
p.252) In a letter to Ho Chi Minh, Johnson explained his
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desire for a peaceful settlement, his willingness to stop the 
bombing, and his desire to freeze the American troop levels 
in South Vietnam. Johnson expressed concern that previous 
overtures to the North Vietnamese regarding peace initiatives 
may have been distorted by intermediaries. To solve this 
problem, direct communication between the two leaders was 
urged. The response of the North Vietnamese leader was that 
all bombing must end before any peace talks or proposals 
would be considered.
19
PART III
George Ball, who was appointed the Under Secretary of 
State for Economic Affairs by John Kennedy and was promoted 
to the Under Secretary of State in November, 1961, was one of 
the consistent critics in the administration of United States 
Vietnam policy during the conflict. He saw the policies of 
the administration in the light of the French experience in 
Vietnam in the 1950's. Ball had also been the director of 
the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Both of these 
experiences had a profound effect on his view of United 
States policy in Vietnam.
At the time of the Tonkin Gulf Incidents, Ball was 
already voicing opposition to the policy of the Johnson 
administration in Vietnam. After the first attack on the 
Maddox in the Gulf, Johnson sent another destroyer, the C. 
Turner Joy, to the area. Ball was upset with that decision, 
as he thought that the United States should stop risking 
destroyers. He was not surprised at the report of the second 
attack in the Gulf on August 4th; he was disturbed. George 
Ball was also privy to some of the doubts expressed by 
President Johnson at the time that the second attack was 
reported. Ball recalls Johnson telling him that "... those 
dumb, stupid sailors were Just shooting at flying
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fish."(Ball, p.370) After the report of the second attack, In 
a meeting which Johnson and Ball attended, McNamara advocated 
a further patrol in the Gulf area in order to "show the flag" 
to the North Vietnamese. Ball's reaction to this plan was 
that it was foolhardy. Ball's rationale in this analysis of 
McNamara's plan was that if a destroyer were to be sunk, it 
would come out in the investigation which was sure to follow 
that the destroyer had been sent to the area only as a 
provocation to the North Vietnamese. Johnson, after hearing 
this analysis of the plan, decided not to send the additional 
destroyer to the area.(Ball, p.379)
Ball was one of the people who saw the potential for 
abuse of power granted in the Southeast Asia Resolution. 
Realizing that the Resolution would allow the President to do 
what he deemed as "necessary” troubled Ball. He referred to 
the resolution in his memoirs as a "terrifyingly open-ended 
grant of power.N(Ball, p.381) Realizing that the America was 
becoming more involved in the conflict, he set about writing 
a memorandum which would challenge the assumptions 
surrounding the American role in Vietnam. Ball worked on the 
memo throughout the fall, finishing the work on October 5, 
1964.(Ball, p.381)
This memo examined the current situation facing the 
Americans in Vietnam. Working from the initial statement 
that the situation was bad and getting worse, Ball examined 
what he saw as the four options which Johnson could follow.
The first option presented was to stay the present course. 
This would result, Ball stated, in either being asked to 
leave by the South Vietnamese government, or being forced 
into a deeper commitment in Vietnam. The second option was 
to send a substantial number of United States combat troops. 
The third option presented was to stage a series of massive 
air attacks against North Vietnam. The last option put forth 
by Ball was to attempt to negotiate a political settlement, 
in an effort to delay the fall of the government of South 
Vietnam to the Communists.(Bal1, p.381)
Ball's memo from the fall of 1964 contained three very 
important predictions which would later prove to be correct. 
The first was that if the United States were to initiate a 
program of massive aerial attacks against North Vietnam that 
this would lead to an invasion of South Vietnam by the North 
Vietnamese army. The second prediction was that if the 
United States began this bombing campaign against the North 
that it would lead to the Introduction of American combat 
troops. Last, Ball predicted that in the event that American 
ground troops were introduced into Vietnam, the U.S. would 
have a difficult time not escalating the hostilities and the 
level of commltment.(Bal1, p.381) As time would tell, all of 
these predictions proved to be correct.
George Ball headed the United States Strategic Bombing 
Survey after World War II. Through all of the interviews and 
analysis of data, two patterns emerged. One, that the will
of a people livin n * po i i state r.«u 1 <i not be broken 
through sustained enemy aerial attacks Second, that for all 
of their efforts to hinder industrial production in Germany, 
the United States attacks had done little substantive damage. 
One of the reasons Lyndon Johnson was in favor of the bombing 
program was the hope that sustained aerial attacks would 
dissuade the North Vietnamese from aiding the Vietcong 
infiltrators. George Ball, as expressed i n his October memo, 
thought differently on the subject. He felt that as long as 
the leaders of the government in Hanot saw a chance of 
eventually emerging victorious from the conflict, that they 
would tolerate a significant amount of damage from American 
attacks,
On January 20, 1966, Ball sent Johnson a memo outlining
the ri isons why he felt that the continuation of the bombing 
program would not meet its objectives. Only three months 
before, Ball had tried to convince Johnson that bombing would 
not dissuade the North from aiding the Vietcong. Further, 
Ball was convinced that continued bombing would not have the 
effect of demoralizing the North Vietnamese people and 
turning the them against their government. Drawing on his 
work on the Strategic Bombing Survey, Ball noted that the 
will of a people living in a police state cannot be 
broken.(Ball, p .406)
This is not to say that Ball disagreed with the wisdom 
of the bombing pauses. However, he supported the pauses for
a different reason than did Johnson. Whereas Johnson wanted 
to use the piuses to bring tie North to the bargaining table, 
Ball supported the pauses because he hoped that they would 
break the rhythm of escalation. (Bal 1 , p.406) However, this 
was no more the case than the pauses fostering peace talks.
As early as 1961, Ball recognized the shortsightedness 
of sending American combat troops to Vietnam. In 1961,
President Kennedy sent Max Taylor and Walt Rostow to Vietnam 
to preform an appraisal of the situation there. After that 
mission, Max Taylor recommended to Kennedy that 8,000 combat 
troops be committed initially. Further, Taylor suggested 
that these troops be disguised as logistical support troops. 
After having heard of the report made to Kennedy by Taylor,
Ball commented to Kennedy that the introduction of troops 
would by the beginning of an irreversible process. Ball told 
Kennedy that within five years there would be 300,000 men in 
the rice paddies, and they would never be seen again.
Kennedy dismissed Ball's concern, telling him that "George, 
you're just crazier than hell. That just isn't going to 
happen."(Ball, p.366) By the end of 1966, there were close 
to 400,000 American combat troops in Vietnam.
Why was George Ball's advice not heeded by Lyndon 
Johnson? Perhaps the answer to this question can be found in 
an examination of the relationship between the two men. Ball 
recalls an Incident where Johnson told Ball that he "wasn't 
one of those smart-ass eggheads(Ball, p.426) Ball's
2 4
impressions of Johnson were that he viewed relations between 
governments as really relations between people and 
personalities.(Bal1, p.427) Despite the criticism of 
Johnson's policies which were advanced by Ball, he recalls 
Johnson as being a "friendly listener."(Ball, p . 4 3 0 )
However, these qualities which Ball gives to Johnson do not 
tend to indicate a personality given to a close analysis of 
history, or reasoned advice from those who were not 
"eggheads". Rather, They indicate a willingness to cling 
tenaciously to the belief that "since we have overwhelming 
technology, and I can talk to Ho, things will turn out the 
way we want them to".
In his memoirs, Lyndon Johnson does not go into any 
detail regarding his feelings toward George Ball. However, a 
synthesis of other recollections might aid in this analysis. 
Recall the comment addressed to Ball from Johnson. Karnow 
asserts that Ball was valuable to Johnson as a "devil's 
advocate".(Karnow, p,404) In this capacity, he was a comfort 
to Johnson. By speaking his mind, he helped him see other 
sides of an issue which many of Johnson's other advisers 
would not raise.
In the end, though, it was Johnson's determination not 
to lose Vietnam which drove him to escalate the conflict. 
Ball's urgings were swept aside as unconvincing and unviable.
The were unviable for the reason that to follow them
would result in what was unthinkable to Johnson: the defeat
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of American strength in a little third-world country. Of 
course, in x\e last analysis, this is exactly what happened.
CONCLUSION
In the preparation of this paper, I have learned much.
To be certain, one of the most important lessons to be found 
here is that quite often, a careful reading of history will 
serve policy makers far better than a tendency to look at 
ideals. Without a doubt, that tendency was one of the major 
reasons that Lyndon Johnson was not able to accomplish what 
he wanted in the Vietnam conflict, Paying little heed to the 
French experience, paying little heed to the studies of 
bombing in World War II, he chose to put more stock in the 
ability of the American system to produce a victory. In 
matters where the practical and rational conflict with the 
ideal, the practical side will usually prevail.
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